A Phishing-as-a-Service operation dubbed BigBear 2.0 has compromised Microsoft 365 accounts at 258 organizations by intercepting authentication traffic and stealing session cookies issued after users completed MFA.
Researchers at CloudSEK, a threat-intelligence company, uncovered the operation in June after gaining access to its administrative panel. A post on the company’s website dated September 7 provides details of the investigation and techniques associated with the campaign.
BigBear 2.0 is based on Evilginx2, an open-source framework that uses a reverse proxy to intercept credentials and authenticated session cookies during phishing attacks.
CloudSEK uncovered 5,137 entries containing stolen authentication data in BigBear 2.0’s administrative panel. These entries included 1,032 plaintext passwords, 4,148 session cookies, and 474 instances in which attackers captured a complete authenticated session despite MFA. As some entries fell into more than one category, these figures should not be interpreted as numbers of distinct victims.
How BigBear 2.0 hijacks authenticated sessions
BigBear 2.0 positions a reverse proxy between a victim and Microsoft’s authentication infrastructure. When victims visit a phishing page, BigBear 2.0 relays their interactions to Microsoft while capturing their credentials.
After a victim completes MFA, Microsoft issues an authenticated session cookie. BigBear 2.0 intercepts and replays this cookie, potentially giving an attacker access to Outlook, Teams, SharePoint, OneDrive, and connected applications.
The campaign does not exploit a vulnerability in Microsoft’s MFA system; it steals the authenticated session created after the user completes all authentication steps.
CloudSEK also found custom JavaScript designed to suppress FIDO2/WebAuthn functionality, pushing victims toward authentication methods that can be phished. Other code was designed to block Microsoft telemetry and automatically select the “Keep me signed in” option, while an API enabled automated cookie replay.
The platform also used residential proxies covering 69 countries to make authentication attempts appear to originate from a victim’s country.
Known targets and recommendations
CloudSEK described the operation as active as of September 7. Its investigation identified 461 targeted organizations, but the company subsequently clarified to BleepingComputer that 258 had suffered at least one completed compromise.
Campaign records covered more than 40 countries, with the highest numbers linked to India, France, Saudi Arabia, New Zealand, and Germany. IT service providers were the most heavily targeted, which could place their downstream customers at risk.
CloudSEK advises potentially affected organizations to reset exposed passwords, revoke session and refresh tokens, and require re-authentication. It also recommends adopting FIDO2/WebAuthn-based authentication, Conditional Access policies, and compliant-device requirements.
Microsoft has not issued BigBear-specific guidance, but its general guidance on identity attacks recommends combining MFA with risk-based Conditional Access policies that assess signals such as device status and unusual sign-in activity. It also recommends prioritizing phishing-resistant MFA for privileged accounts.