In a new campaign dubbed wfx-loot, hackers have targeted tens of thousands of GitHub repositories in order to steal sensitive credentials, with affected entities including the US General Services Administration, the French government, Fortune 100 companies, and more.
According to an investigation by cybersecurity firm Aikido, the campaign began on November 10 when an unknown threat actor used stolen GitHub credentials to distribute a malicious payload into tens of thousands of repositories hosted on the platform. This payload was intended to steal GitHub Actions secrets and cloud credentials, with the attacker “targeting CI secrets rather than attempting to proliferate through the supply chain.”
In total, Aikido said that 4,837 compromised accounts were used to open probe pull requests in 61,764 repositories. Of those, at least 1,835 repositories ran the payload and had their secrets stolen.
The idea was for the pull request to find repositories that the compromised GitHub accounts could write malicious code to. Once those were identified, the threat actor either injected around 1,500 lines of code into an existing GitHub Actions workflow or added a new workflow on a short-lived branch.
The payload attempted to collect GitHub Actions runtime tokens; cloud credentials for the likes of AWS, Azure and Google Cloud; developer credentials for GitHub, Docker, Kubernetes and more; AI credentials for OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini and others; and other secrets, including .env files, private keys, process memory and workflow artifacts. The whole workflow shared similarities with the GhostAction hacking campaign.
After the data was exfiltrated, the attacker quickly reverted their changes and deleted the logs in an attempt to cover their tracks. The malicious script also attempted to establish persistence so that it could continue operating after credentials and tokens were rotated.
If your organization has a GitHub account, Aikido advised that it might be affected if you’ve noticed a wfx-docs branch appear in a repository you can write to on or after November 10, or if you have received a pull request titled “docs: dependency audit notes.”
Any commits titled “ci: refresh build cache,” “chore: add ci helper” or “chore: add dependency audit workflow” could also be suspicious, as could short-lived branches named “chore/” followed by eight random characters.
“If the payload ran in your repository, assume every secret and cloud role available to its workflows is compromised,” Aikido warned. In that instance, affected credentials should be rotated immediately.